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ABSTRACT 
This Note applies the concept of rational voting to explain the 
attitudes of a sample of Pasadena voters towards the 1978 Jarvis-Gann 
tax cut initiative. 
A NOTE ON THE 1978 JARVIS-GANN ELECTION 
Joel Balbien 
Jarvis Gann was California's third and only successful 
referendum in a decade, limiting the amount of property tax that 
can be collected from real property.1 Because of the fiscal nature 
of the initiative the concept of rational voting, as defined by 
Anthony Downs (1957), seems an obvious explanation of the vote.2 
It may also account for the defeat of two similar initiatives, 
Proposition 9 in 1968 and Proposition 14 in November 1972. 
Downs hypothesized that in a two-party system, the rational 
voter compares the stream of utility income from government action 
he has received under the present regime with those streams he 
believes he would have received if the opposition party had been in 
office.3 Alternatively the voter might compare two hypothetical 
future utility incomes. The difference or party differential 
determines his voting preference. Downs' model can be adapted to 
accommodate a tax cutting referendum. 
Let a community consist of a group of voters, each with 
quasiconcave utility that depends on his or her consumption of a 
vector of goods and services provided by the public and/or private 
sectors. Given a set of relative prices which include tax rates, 
the consumer selects a bundle of private goods (including leisure) 
which maximizes his utility subject to his after tax income. 
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However, assuming limited mobility, representative democracy gives 
the individual voter only indirect and periodic political control 
over tax rates and the vector of public services funded by the 
legislature and delivered by the civil servants. This is of course 
necessary because of the free rider problem associated with many 
public services. If given a choice, many voters might refuse �o pay 
for services they would not be excluded from. Moreover, institutional 
barriers, lumpiness in the production of public goods, and Av.row's 
impossibility theorem may preclude marginal adjustment of individual 
tax rates and service levels to reach a social optimum. As a result, 
the voter imputes whatever utility income he derives from the bundle 
of public services and compares this to the disutility of his tax 
liability at election time. If the rational voter believes his 
utility deficit or surplus can be improved, he votes against the 
incumbent legislator or executive and in favor of his or her challenger. 
If played out over many elections, in a stable electorate without 
inflation or intervention from other levels of government, such a 
simple political economy might reach a Nash equilibirium with respect 
to tax rates and public service levels. 
However, in a dynamic political economy characterized by 
i) inflation, ii) intergovernmental transfers, iii) incremental budgeting 
of programs, iv) uncertainties about public opinion, a gradual shift 
in the median voter's willingness to pay for a package of public 
services may be ignored by elected officials. In this setting a 
tax cutting referendum enables dissatisfied voters to bypass both the 
legislative and executive branches of state and local government by 
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voting directly to lower their taxes. 
However, the resulting tax cut will have an uncertain 
impact on the future mix and level of public services provided by 
the government. Unlike the federal government, state and local 
governments cannot finance deficits by borrowing or printing more 
money. Thus, if real tax revenues fall, either operating slack, 
i.e. , managerial discretionary profit, must be lowered, surpluses 
drained, or services cut. Whether a rational voter will support or 
oppose a taxcutting referendum will depend on a comparison between 
his expected future utility income stream as determined by current 
tax rates and levels of services, and a hypothetical utility income 
determined by i) his valuation of the tax benefits offered by the 
referendum, ii) his beliefs about changes in the mix of services 
that will follow passage of the initiative, and iii) his assessment 
of the level of slack in current government operations. 
A rational voting model of public choice in a tax cutting 
referendum is supported by data gathered in surveys conducted both 
prior to and on the day of the Proposition 13 election. A Los Angeles 
Times - Channel 2 News survey of 2500 voters on election day indicated 
that financial self-interest was the primary explanation of the vote.
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Voters who owned homes and had no public employees in the family 
voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 13, i.e., 81 percent yes vs. 
19 percent no. In contrast, the survey found that voters who lived 
in rental housing and included public employees voted 28 percent in 
favor of Proposition 13 and 80 percent in favor of Proposition 8, 
a less drastic property tax reduction approved by the legislature 
just prior to the election.5 The poll also asked voters directly why 
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they voted for Proposition 13. Greater than half of the respondents 
6 said that property taxes should be lowered. However 22 percent of 
the voters gave as the reason they voted for Proposition 13 government 
provides many unnecessary services.7 Finally, the survey suggested 
that many pro-Jarvis voters felt that some government services were 
inefficiently procured. Less than 25 percent of those who voted 
for Jarvis-Gann said yes when asked, "Do you think local services will 
be lowered if Proposition 13 passes?118 
One of the problems with the statistical analysis of 
the KNXT-Channel 2 Poll taken by Facts Consolidated was a uni-
variate approach with respect to the factors that might determine a 
voter's chofce.9 In particular, i) the relative net tax benefits of 
Proposition 8 and 13, ii) the voter's perception of the efficiency of 
current government operations, iii) his expectation of the impact on 
vital services, and iv) the value he associates with the current 
bundle of public services supplied by state and local governments. On 
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Do you agree or disagree Jarvis-Gann would force government to be 
more efficient? 
EFFICIENT 
GOVERNMENT For Against Undecided 
Agree 77 .0 10.7 12.7 100 
Disagree 15.1 73.6 11.3 100 
Total sample 44.6 30.4 25.0 100 
Significance Level Controlling for Tax Bill and Cuts: .1%;, 
If the Jarvis amendment passes, do you think your total tax bill 
will go up, down, or stay the same, or don't you know at this time? 
TAX BILL For· Against Undecided 
Up 33.3 51.9 14.8 100 
Down 68.5 21.9 9.6 100 
Same or 35.8 30.8 33.3 100 
Undecided 
Significance Level Controlling for Efficient Government and Cuts: 1.1%"' 
May 9, 1978 a random telephone survey of registered Pasadena voters Do you agree or disagree that there would be drastic cuts in important 
local services if Jarvis-Gann passed? 
was conducted by a graduate Social Science class at the California 
Institute of Technology.10 Among several questions asked were a few 
concerning future service levels, government efficiency, a voter's 
expectations about his future local tax bill, and the size of local 
government. Analysis of contingency tables showed that a voter's 
response to the first three issues offered the best explanation of 
his or her attitudes towards Proposition 13. Furthermore, partial 
correlation analysis suggested that each of the three factors made 
an independent contribution to the voter's decision. 
CUTS For Against Undecided 
Agree 21.1 75.4 3.5 
Disagree 66.4 16 . 1 17.5 
Significance Level Controlling for Efficient Government and Tax Bill: .1%* 
*Correlation Coefficient 
Source: Graduate Social Science course, California Institute of 
Technology, Pasadena, California (May 1978). 
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